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We argue that the equity premium puzzle may be explained by the fact that most market 
participants (equity investors, investment banks, analysts, companies…) do not use standard 
theory (such as a standard representative consumer asset pricing model) for determining their 
Required Equity Premium, but rather, they use historical data and advice from textbooks and 
finance professors. Consequently, ex-ante equity premia have been high, market prices have been 
consistently undervalued, and the ex-post risk premia has been also high. 
Professors use, in class and in their textbooks, high equity premia (average around 6%, range 
from 3 to 10%), and investors use higher equity premia for valuing companies (average around 
6%). The overall result is that equity prices have been, on average, undervalued in the last 
decades and, consequently, the measured ex-post equity premium is also high. As most investors 
use historical data and textbook prescriptions to estimate the required and the expected equity 
premium, the undervaluation and the high ex-post risk premium are self fulfilling prophecies. 
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THE EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLE:  
HIGH REQUIRED EQUITY PREMIUM, UNDERVALUATION 




1. Introduction  
 
The equity premium puzzle, a term coined by Mehra and Prescott (1985), is the inability of a 
standard representative consumer asset pricing model, using aggregate data, to reconcile the 
Historical Equity Premium (HEP). To reconcile the model with the HEP, individuals must have 
implausibly high risk aversion according to standard economics models.
1 Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) argued that stocks should provide at most a 0.35% premium over bills. Even by 
stretching the parameter estimates, Mehra and Prescott (2003) conclude that the premium 
should be no more than 1%. This contrasts starkly with their HEP estimate of 6.2%, with an 
update of Welch (2000), who reports that in December 2007, 90% of professors used in their 
classrooms equity premiums between 4% and 8.5%, and with Fernández (2008b) who reports 
that in June 2008, 39 finance professors used equity premiums between 3.5% and 10% (average 
5.5%) and 219 companies used equity premiums between 2% and 30% (average 6.3%). 
The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market premium 
and risk premium), is one of the most important, discussed but elusive parameters in finance. 
The term equity premium is used to designate four different concepts: 
1.  Historical equity premium (HEP): historical differential return of the stock market over 
treasuries. 
2.  Expected equity premium (EEP): expected differential return of the stock market over 
treasuries. 
                                              
1 Kocherlakota (1996) reduces the models to just three assumptions: individuals have preferences associated with the 
standard utility function, asset markets are complete (individuals can write insurance contracts against any 
contingency), and asset trading is costless. According to Weitzman (2007), the key assumption of those models is 
that the subjective probability distribution of the outcomes believed by agents is equal to the distribution generated 
by the system.  
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3.  Required  equity premium (REP): incremental return of a diversified portfolio (the 
market) over the risk-free rate required by an investor. It is used for calculating the 
required return to equity. 
4.  Implied equity premium (IEP): the required equity premium embedded in market prices. 
The four concepts are different.
2 The HEP is easy to calculate and is equal for all investors,
3 but 
the REP, the EEP and the IEP are not observable magnitudes. Different finance authors claim 
different relations among the four equity premiums defined above. These relationships vary 
widely: 
•  HEP = EEP = REP (i.e., Brealey and Myers, 1996; Stowe et al., 2002; Welch and Goyal, 
2008). 
•  EEP is smaller than HEP (i.e., Mayfield, 2004, HEP-2.4%; Booth, 1999, HEP-2%). 
•  EEP is near zero (i.e., McGrattan and Prescott, 2001; Arnott and Bernstein, 2002). 
•  REP = IEP (i.e., Fama and French, 2002; Goedhart et al, 2002; Harris et al., 2003; Arzac, 
2007). 
There are also authors who “have no official position” (Brealey and Myers, 2005) and authors 
who claim “that no one knows what the REP is” (Penman, 2003). 
We argue that the equity premium puzzle may be explained by the fact that most market 
participants (companies, equity investors, professors, investment banks, analysts…) do not use 
standard theory (such as a standard representative consumer asset pricing model) for 
determining their REP, but rather, they use historical data and advice from textbooks and 
finance professors. Consequently, REPs have been high, market prices have been consistently 
undervalued and the HEP (ex post risk premia) has been also high (in about the magnitude of 
the REPs used ex-ante). 
If the additional return beyond the risk-free rate demanded by equity investors (REP or ex-ante 
risk premium used in financial asset pricing models) has been high, it is not a surprise that the 
HEP (or ex-post risk premium calculated with historical data) has been also high. If most 
investors use historical data or the recommendations of textbooks to estimate the REP and the 
EEP, the undervaluation and the high HEP (or ex-post risk premium) are self fulfilling 
prophecies.
4 This paper is an attempt to address a real world reality, instead of an ideal world 
with some unrealistic assumptions. 
In the rest of the paper we show that investors have used required equity premiums much 
higher than theory suggests as reasonable according to the risk of equities. Section 2 presents 
different estimates of the Historical Equity Premium (HEP). Section 3 contains several attempts 
to explain the equity premium puzzle. Section 4 presents different estimates of the Expected 
Equity Premium (EEP). In section 5, we review different estimates of the Implied Equity 
                                              
2 Bostock (2004) maintains that “understanding the equity premium is largely a matter of using clear terms”. 
3 Provided they use the same time frame, the same market index, the same risk-free instrument and the same 
average (arithmetic or geometric). 
4 “Self-Fulfilling Prophecy” is a phrase coined (and a concept first articulated) by Robert K. Merton (1948), late father 
of the Nobel laureate R.C. Merton.  
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Premium (IEP) and show that there are several pairs (IEP, expected growth) that fit with market 
prices. Section 6 contains the prescriptions of the main finance and valuation textbooks about 
the equity premium. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. How Large is the Historical Equity Premium? 
The first studies of the historical equity return were made by Smith (1926, showed that between 
1901 and 1922 an equity investor outperformed a bond investor),
5 and Cowles (1939, 
documented a positive long term equity performance from 1872 to 1937 for the NYSE). Fisher 
and Lorie (1964), using for the first time the database of stock prices completed at the 
University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), showed that the average 
return from a random investment in NYSE stocks from 1926 to 1964 was 9.1% a year.
6 
2.1. Estimates of the Historical Equity Premium 
The HEP (or ex-post equity premium) is the historical average differential return of the market 
portfolio over the risk-free debt. Table 1 contains the 1926-2005 average returns and HEP for 
the United States according to Ibbotson Associates (2006), the most widely cited source.  
Table 1 
Returns and HEP according to Ibbotson Associates (2006), 1926-2005 
  Average return (%)  Standard  Serial 





S&P 500  12.3  10.4  20.2  3 
Long-Term Gov. Bonds  5.8  5.5  9.2  -8 
T-Bills 3.8  3.7  3.1  91 
HEP over Gov. Bonds  6.5  4.9     
HEP over T-Bills  8.5  6.7     
 
Schwert (1990) and Siegel (1994, 1999, 2002, 2005a) studied the relationship between United 
States equity and bonds before 1926. The data on which they base their studies is less reliable 
than recent data, but the results are, nevertheless, interesting. Table 2 shows their conclusions: 
the HEP and the inflation in the period 1802-1925 were substantially smaller than in 
subsequent years
7.  Table 1 provides a higher HEP than Table 2 because Ibbotson does not 
consider the income return of the bonds. 
 
 
                                              
5 But three years after publication, the market crash happened. Benjamin Graham blamed Smith's book for inspiring 
an “orgy of uncontrolled speculation”. 
6 For a more detailed history see Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006). 
7 Siegel (1999) argues that this is because bond returns were exceptionally low after 1926, while total equity returns 
were relatively stable over the whole time period.   
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Table 2 
Real returns and HEP from Siegel (2005a) 
arith. = arithmetic average. geom. = geometric average 
  Average real returns (%)       
 Stocks  Bonds  HEP  (%)   
 arith.  geom.  arith. geom. arith.  geom. Inflation  (%) 
1802-1870 8.28 7.02 5.11 4.78 3.17 2.24  0.1 
1871-1925 7.92 6.62 3.93 3.73 3.99 2.89  0.6 
1926-2004 8.78 6.78 2.77 2.25 6.01 4.53  3.1 
 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006) employ a new NYSE database for 1815-1925
8 to estimate the 
United States equity returns and the HEP since 1792 (but they mention that dividend data is 
absent pre-1825, and is incomplete in the period 1825-1971). Their main results are in Table 3. 
Note that their estimates for the period 1926-2004 are different from those in Table 2. 
Table 3 
Average return (%) of the United States according to Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006) 














Stocks  7.93  6.99 14.64    Stocks  12.39  10.43 20.32 
Bonds  4.17  4.16 4.17    Gov.  Bonds  5.82  5.44 9.30 
Inflation  0.85  0.61 7.11    Inflation  3.12  3.04 4.32 
HEP (Bonds)  3.76  2.83      HEP (Bonds)  6.57  4.99   
Total returns from 1871 to 1925 are constructed from the Price-Weighted NYSE and the Cowles Income Return Series. 
 
Table 4 also shows that different authors do not get the same HEP result even using the same 
time frame (1926-2005), average (geometric or arithmetic) and risk-free instrument (Long-Term 
Government Bonds or T-Bills). The differences (between 0.7% and 1.2%) are mainly due to the 
stock indexes chosen: Wilson and Jones (2002) note that the S&P Index returns have often been 
misrepresented
9 and reconstruct the weekly S&P Composite for the period 1926-56. Siegel and 
Schwartz (2006) calculate the return of the original S&P 500 companies since 1957 until 2003 




                                              
8 See Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng (2001), who collected United States stock market data by hand from 1815. 
9 Standard & Poor's first developed stock price indices in 1923 and in 1927 created the Composite Index (90 stocks). 
On March 1, 1957, the Composite was expanded to 500 stocks and renamed S&P 500 Index (its market value was 
$173 billion, 85% of the value of all NYSE listed stocks). From 1926 to 1957 there were two S&P indexes: the S&P 
Composite daily (90 stocks until 1957) and the S&P Composite weekly (more than 400). 
10 The market value of the S&P 500 companies that have survived from the original 1957 list was only 31% of the 
2003 year-end S&P 500's market value. Since the S&P 500 was formulated, more than 900 new companies have been 
added to the index (and an equal number deleted).  
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Table 4 
Different Historical Equity Premiums (HEP) according to different authors 
    United States 1926-2005    Dimson et al., 1900-2005 







Geometric  4.9 5.5  4.4  5.1  4.6    4.5 5.3  4.0  4.1  HEP vs. LT 
Gov. Bonds  Arithmetic  6.5 7.0  5.8  6.7  6.1    6.5 8.4  6.1  5.2 
Geometric  6.7 6.0  6.2  6.3  6.2    5.5 3.8  4.8  4.2  HEP vs. 
T-Bills  Arithmetic  8.5 7.7  7.9  8.2  8.2    7.4 9.1  7.1  5.9 
Sources: Ibbotson Associates (2006). http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.  WJ: updated from Wilson and Jones 
(2002). Damodaran: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/. Siegel: updated from Siegel (2005). Dimson et al.: Table 3 of 
Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2007). 
 
Table 5 contains some of the HEPs reported by different authors for the United States. 
According to Constantinides (2002), the average premium of the arithmetic rate of return of the 
S&P Composite Index over the risk-free rate, measured over the last 130 years, is 6.9%.
11 
Ibbotson and Chen (2003) use 1926-2000 historical equity returns and conclude that the 
expected long-term equity premium (relative to the long-term government bond yield) is 5.9% 
arithmetically, and 3.97% geometrically.  
Table 5 
Historical Equity Premium (HEP) for the United States according to different authors 
Author(s) Reference/average 
Period for 
HEP  HEP (%) 
Siegel (2002)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2001  4.9 
Constantinides (2002)  T-Bills, arith.  1926-2000  9.3 
Constantinides (2002)  T-Bills, arith.  1872-2000  6.9 
Constantinides (2002)  T-Bills, arith.  1951-2000  8.7 
Ibbotson and Chen (2003)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2000   3.97 
Siegel (2005a)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2004  4.53 
Ibbotson Associates (2006)  T-Bonds arith. capital aprec. only  1926-2005  7.1 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006)  T-Bonds, geo.  1792-1925  2.83 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2004  4.99 
Welch and Goyal (2008)    1872-2004  4.77 
Welch and Goyal (2008)    1927-2004  6.35 
Dimson et al.(2007)  T-Bonds, geo. United States  1900-2005  4.52 
 
Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) constructed a database of capital gain indexes for 39 markets 
and concluded that “for 1921 to 1996, United States equities had the highest real return for all 
countries, at 4.3%, versus a median of 0.8% for other countries… there are reasons to suspect 
that [the United States] estimates are subject to survivorship”. However, Dimson and Marsh 
(2001) do not find survivorship bias for the United States and estimate the geometric HEP for 
                                              
11 “Over the period 1872 to 2000, the sample mean of the equity premium is 6.9%. Even though one may introduce 
one’s own strong prior beliefs and adjust downwards the sample average estimate of the premium, the unconditional 
mean equity premium is at least 6%. Over the period 1926 to 2000, the equity premium is 9.3%.”  
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1955-1999 of United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan in 6.2%, 6.2%, 6.3% and 
7.0%. 
Dimson et al. (2002) show that the HEP was generally higher for the second half of the 20
th 
century: the World had 4.7% in the first half, compared to 6.2% in the second half. The 
estimates of Dimson et al. (2007) (see Table 4) use data of 105 years but, as the authors point 
out, “virtually all of the 16 countries experienced trading breaks… often in wartime”: World 
War I, World War II, Spanish Civil War… They claim that “we were able to bridge these gaps,” 
but this assertion is questionable.
12 Brailsford et al. (2008) also document concerns about data 
quality in Australia prior to 1958. 
2.2. A Closer Look at the Historical Data 
Figure 1 shows that interest rates were lower than dividend yields until 1958. It suggests that 
many things have changed in the capital markets and that the last 50 years have been different 
than the previous ones. It is quite sensible to assume that the portfolio theory, the CAPM, the 
APT, the VAR analysis, the futures and options markets, the appearance of many mutual and 
hedge funds, the increase of investors, the legislation to protect investors, financial innovation, 
electronic trading, portfolio insurance, market participation… all these have changed the 
behavior and the risk attitudes of investors. In fact, financial markets are so different that the 
relative magnitude of dividend yields to interest rates has been reversed.  
Figure 2 shows the raw data used in Figure 1, highlights the change in the market around 1960 
and allows us to contrast the different behavior of the markets in the periods 1871-1958 and 
1959-2005.  
Figure 1 








Source: Robert Shiller’s Website: http: //aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
 
                                              
12 Dimson et al. (2007) explain that “In Spain, trading was suspended during the Civil War from July 1936 to April 
1939, and the Madrid exchange remained closed through February 1940; over the closure we assume a zero change 
in nominal stock prices and zero dividends.” They also mention an “unbridgeable discontinuity, namely, bond and 
bill (but not equity) returns in Germany during the hyperinflation of 1922-1923, when German bond and bill 
investors suffered a total loss of –100%. … When reporting equity premiums for Germany … we thus have no 
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Figure 2 







Source of the raw data: Robert Shiller’s Website: http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the HEP for the United States. The HEP since 1926 has been 
always higher than 6%, while the HEP calculated with the data of the last 20 years has varied 
over time between 0 and 16%. 
Figure 3 
HEP (Historical Equity Premium) of the United States Market. Geometric average of the differential 







Source of the data: Ibbotson and Datastream.  
 
Harvey and Siddique (2000) show that the equity premium is non-normally distributed, 
exhibiting excess kurtosis and significant negative skewness. 
3. Some Attempts to Explain the Equity Premium Puzzle 
The equity premium puzzle (the HEP is greater than theory predicts) has lead to an extensive 
research effort in both macroeconomics and finance. Over the last 23 years, researchers have 
tried to resolve the puzzle by generalizing and adapting some assumptions of the Mehra-
Prescott (1985) model, but there is no solution generally accepted by the economics profession. 
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•  Alternative assumptions about preferences (state separability, leisure, precautionary 
savings) or generalizations to state-dependent utility functions: Abel, 1990; 
Constantinides, 1990; Epstein and Zin, 1991; Bakshi and Chen, 1996; Campbell and 
Cochrane, 1999 and Barberis et al. 2001. 
•  Narrow framing:
13 Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis and Huang, 2006. 
•  Probability distributions that admit disastrous events such as fear of catastrophic 
consumption drops: Rietz,1988; Mehra and Prescott, 1988; Barro, 2006.
14 
•  Bayesian updating of unknown structural parameters: Weitzman (2007),
15 and Gollier, 
2007. 
•  Survivorship bias: Brown et al., 1995. 
•  Liquidity premium: Bansal and Coleman, 1996. 
•  Changes in taxes and regulation: McGrattan and Prescott, 2005.
16 
•  The presence of uninsurable income shocks or incomplete markets: Mankiw, 1986; 
Constantinides and Duffie, 1996; Heaton and Lucas, 1996, 1997; Storesletten et al., 
1999.  
•  Relative volatility of stocks and bonds: Asness, 2000. 
•  Limited stock market participation and limited diversification: Saito, 1995; Basak and 
Cuocco, 1998; Heaton and Lucas, 2000;
17 Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Gomes and 
Michaelides, 2005. 
•  Distinguishing between the cash flows to equity and aggregate consumption: Brennan 
and Xia, 2001. 
•  Transaction costs in the form of borrowing constraints: Constantinides et al., 2002. 
•  Other market imperfections: Aiyagari and Gertler, 1991; Alvarez and Jermann, 2000. 
                                              
13 Narrow framing is the phenomenon documented in experimental settings whereby, when people are offered a new 
gamble, they sometimes evaluate it in isolation, separately from their other risks. 
14 Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) suggest that low-probability disasters, such as a large “crash” in consumption or an 
economic depression with partial default by the government on its borrowing may justify a large equity premium. 
However, Mehra and Prescott (1988) challenge Rietz to identify such catastrophic events and estimate their 
probabilities. 
15 Weitzman (2007) and Gollier (2007) acknowledge the presence of parameter uncertainty: they allow for several 
plausible scenarios for future growth and show that, in such an environment, rates should in effect be lower the 
greater the maturity. However, Granger (2007) claims that Weitzman uses an unrealistically tight distribution for 
return deviations. 
16 McGrattan and Prescott (2005) argue that the 1960-2001 HEP is mainly due to changes in taxes and regulatory 
policy during this period, and they affirm that “Allowing for heterogeneous individuals will also help quantify the 
effects of increased market participation and diversification that has occurred in the past two decades”. 
17 Heaton and Lucas (2000), using an overlapping generations model, concluded that the increases in participation of 
the past two decades are unlikely to cause a significant reduction in the EEP, but that improved portfolio 
diversification might explain a fall in the EEP of several percentage points.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 9 
•  Disentangling the equity premium into its cash flow and discounting components: 
Bakshi and Chen, 2006. 
•  Measurement errors and poor consumption growth proxies: Breeden et al., 1989; 
Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Ferson and Harvey, 1992; Ait-Sahalia et al, 2006. 
•  Shifting volatility in the real economy: Lettau et al., 2008.
18  
There are several excellent surveys of this work, including Cochrane (1997), Mehra and Prescott 
(2003 and 2006), and Kocherlakota (1996), who admits that “the large equity premium is still 
largely a mystery to economists.” 
Limited stock market participation can increase the REP by concentrating stock market risk on 
a subset of the population. To understand why limited participation may have quantitative 
significance for the REP, it is useful to review basic facts about the distribution of wealth, and 
its dynamics over time. Mishel et al. (2006) document that wealth and stock holdings in the 
United States remain highly concentrated in dollar terms: in 2004, the wealthiest 10% held 
78.8% of the stocks (84% in 1989), and the wealthiest 20% held over 90% of all stocks. Only 
48.6% of United States households held stocks in 2004 (31.7% in 1989) and only 34.9% (22.6% 
in 1989) held stock worth more than $5,000. Of this 34.9%, only 13.5% had direct holdings. 
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) reported that 72.4% of the 2998 families in their survey held no 
stocks at all. Among the families that held more than $100,000 in liquid assets, only 48% held 
stock. The covariance of stock returns and consumption of the families that hold stocks is triple 
that of no stockholders and it helps to explain part of the puzzle.  
Brennan (2004) highlights the “democratization of equity Investment:” between 1989 and 2000, 
“while bond funds roughly tripled, equity funds went up by a factor of over 14!... the share of 
corporate equity held by mutual funds rose from 6.6% in 1990 to 18.3% in 2000.” 
Abel (1991) hoped that “incorporating differences among investors or more general attitudes 
toward risk can explain the various statistical properties of asset returns.” Bakshi and Chen 
(1994) noted an increase in risk premiums as investors aged. Levy and Levy (1996) mentioned 
that the introduction of a small degree of diversity in expectations changed the dynamics of 
their model and produced more realistic results. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) introduced 
heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent and heteroscedastic labor income shocks.  
It is interesting the quotation in Siegel and Thaler (1997): “no economic theorist has been 
completely successful in resolving the [equity premium] puzzle” ... but ... “most economists we 
know have a very high proportion of their retirement wealth invested in equities (as we do).” 
4. Expected Equity Premium (EEP) 
The Expected Equity Premium (EEP) is the answer to a question we all would like to answer 
accurately, namely: what incremental return do I expect from the market portfolio over the 
risk-free rate over the next years? The EEP is very important for investors who must decide 
how to allocate their portfolios to safe and risky assets. Some relevant questions about the EEP 
                                              
18 They attribute the lower equity risk premiums of the 1990s to reduced volatility in real economic variables 
including employment, consumption and GDP growth.  
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are: Is its distribution objective and stationary? Does EEP vary over time? Is EEP ever negative? 
Does the market have an EEP? 
Numerous papers and books assert that there must be an EEP common to all investors (to the 
representative investor) and identify the EEP with the REP. However, investors do not share 
“homogeneous expectations”
19 and most equity investors do not hold the market portfolio but, 
rather, a subgroup of stocks. Heterogeneous investors do not hold the same portfolio of risky 
assets; in fact, no investor must hold the market portfolio to clear the market.  
Several authors consider that the equity premium is a stationary process, and claim that the 
HEP is an unbiased estimate of the EEP (unconditional mean equity premium). For example, 
Mehra and Prescott (2003) state that “…over the long horizon the equity premium is likely to be 
similar to what it has been in the past”.
20 However, the HEP changes over time, and it is not 
clear why capital market data from the 19
th century or from the first half of the 20
th century 
may be useful in estimating expected returns in the 21st century. As Shiller (2000) points out, 
“the future will not necessarily be like the past.” Booth (1999) concludes that the HEP is not a 
good estimator of the EEP and estimates the latter at 200 basis points smaller than the HEP.
21 
Mayfield (2004) suggest that a structural shift in the process governing the volatility of market 
returns after the 1930s resulted in a decrease in the expected level of market risk, and 
concluded that EEP = HEP – 2.4% = 5.9% over the yield on T-bills (4.1% over yields on                   
T-bonds).  
Survivorship bias
22 was identified by Brown et al. (1995) as one of the main reasons why the 
results based on historical analyses can be too optimistic. They pointed out that the observed 
return, conditioned on survival (HEP), can overstate the unconditional expected return (EEP). 
However, Li and Xu (2002) show that the survival bias fails to explain the equity premium 
puzzle: “To have high survival bias, the probability of market survival over the long run has to 
be extremely small, which seems to be inconsistent with existing historical evidence.”  
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) present a framework allowing for structural breaks in the risk 
premium over time and estimate that the EEP fluctuated between 4% and 6% over the period 
from 1834 to 1999 and had the sharpest drop in the last decade of the 20
th century. Using extra 
information from return volatility and prices, they narrow the confidence interval of their 
estimation (two standard deviations) to plus or minus 280 basis points around 4.8%. 
Constantinides (2002) draws a sharp distinction between conditional short-term forecasts of the 
mean equity premium and estimates of the unconditional mean. He says that the conditional 
EEPs at the end of the 20
th century and the beginning of the 21
st are substantially lower than 
the estimates of the unconditional EEP (7%). But he concludes that “the low conditional 
                                              
19  Brennan (2004) also admits that “different classes of investor may have different expectations about the 
prospective returns on equities which imply different assessments of the risk premium.” 
20 In the 1970’s, the efficient market hypothesis was interpreted to mean that the true equity premium was a 
constant and was associated with the use of HEP to forecast EEP. 
21 He also points out that the nominal equity return did not follow a random walk and that the volatility of the 
bonds increased significantly over the last 20 years. 
22 “Survivorship” or “survival” bias applies not only to the stocks within the market (the fact that databases contain 
data on companies listed today, but they tend not to have data on companies that went bankrupt or filed for 
bankruptcy protection in the past), but also for the markets themselves (“US market’s remarkable success over the 
last century is typical neither of other countries nor of the future for US stocks,” Dimson et al., 2004).   
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forecasts do not necessarily lessen the burden on economic theory to explain the large sample 
average of the equity return and premium over the past 130 years.” 
Dimson et al. (2003) conclude that the geometric EEP for the world’s major markets should be 
3% (5% arithmetic). Dimson et al.  (2007) admit that “we cannot know today’s consensus 
expectation for the equity premium”, but they affirm that “investors expect an equity premium 
(relative to bills) of around 3-3½% on a geometric mean basis,” substantially lower than the 
HEP found in their own study.  
4.1. Surveys 
A direct way to obtain an expectation of the equity premium is to carry out a survey of 
analysts or investors, although Ilmanen (2003) argues that surveys tend to be optimistic: 
“survey-based expected returns may tell us more about hoped-for returns than about required 
returns.” Shiller
23 publishes and updates an index of investor sentiment since the crash of 1987. 
While neither survey provides a direct measure of the equity risk premium, they yield a broad 
measure of where investors expect stock prices to go in the near future. The 2004 survey of the 
Securities Industry Association (SIA) found that the median EEP of 1500 United States investors 
was about 8.3%. Merrill Lynch surveys more than 300 institutional investors globally in July 
2008: the average EEP was 3.5%. Goldman Sachs (O'Neill et al., 2002) conducted a survey of its 
global clients in July 2002 and the average long-run EEP was 3.9%, with most responses 
between 3.5% and 4.5%. The magazine Pensions and Investments (12-1-1998) carried out a 
survey among professionals working for institutional investors and the average EEP was 3%.  
Graham and Harvey (2007) indicate that United States CFOs reduced their average EEP from 
4.65% in September 2000 to 2.93% by September 2006. In the 2008 survey, they report an 
average EEP of 3.80%, ranging from 3.1% to 11.5% at the tenth percentile at each end of the 
spectrum. They show that average EEP changes through time. 
Welch (2000) performed two surveys with finance professors in 1997 and 1998, asking them 
what they thought the EEP was over the next 30 years. He obtained 226 replies, ranging from 
1% to 15%, with an average arithmetic EEP of 7% above T-Bonds.
24  Welch (2001) presented 
the results of a survey conducted in August 2001 of 510 finance and economics professors, and 
the consensus for the 30-year arithmetic EEP was 5.5%, much lower than just three years 
earlier. Damodaran (2008) points out that “the risk premiums in academic surveys indicate how 
far removed most academics are from the real world of valuation and corporate finance and how 
much of their own thinking is framed by the historical risk premiums... The risk premiums that 
are presented in classroom settings are not only much higher than the risk premiums in practice 
but also contradict other academic research.” 
 
                                              
23 See http://icf.som.yale.edu/Confidence.Index  
24 At that time, the most recent Ibbotson Associates Yearbook was the 1998 edition, with an arithmetic HEP versus 
T-bills of 8.9% (1926-1997).  
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4.2. Regressions  
Attempts to predict the equity premium typically look for some independent lagged predictors 
(X) on the equity premium: Equity Premiumt = a  + b ·Xt-1 + εt 
Many predictors have been explored in the literature. Some examples are: 
•  Dividend yield: Ball, 1978; Rozeff, 1984; Campbell, 1987; Campbell and Shiller, 1988; 
Fama and French, 1988; Hodrick, 1992; Campbell and Viceira, 2002; Campbell and 
Yogo, 2006; Lewellen, 2004, and Menzly et al., 2004. Cochrane, 1997 has a good survey 
of the dividend yield prediction literature. 
•  Short term interest rate: Hodrick, 1992.  
•  Earnings price and payout ratio: Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Lamont, 1998, and Ritter 
2005. 
•  Term spread and default spread: Avramov, 2002; Campbell, 1987; Fama and French, 
1989, and Keim and Stambaugh, 1986. 
•  Inflation rate (money illusion): Fama and Schwert, 1977; Fama, 1981; Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho, 2004, and Cohen et al., 2005.
25 
•  Interest rate and dividend related variables: Ang and Bekaert, 2007. 
•  Book-to-market ratio: Kothari and Shanken, 1997. 
•  Value of high and low-beta stocks: Polk et al., 2006.
26 
•  Consumption and wealth: Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001. 
•  Aggregate financing activity: Baker and Wurgler, 2000, and Boudoukh et al., 2007. 
Wachter and Warusawitharana (2007) claim that the predictability increases in a Bayesian 
setting that includes uncertainty about both the existence and strength of predictability. 
However, Welch and Goyal (2008) argue that the historical mean has done as well at 
forecasting the expected equity premium as any of the more complex empirical models found 
in the literature. They used most of the mentioned predictors and could not identify one that 
would have been robust for forecasting the equity premium and, after all their analysis, they 
recommended “assuming that the equity premium is ‘like it always has been’.” They also show 
                                              
25 Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argued that low equity values of the late 1970s were the consequence of investors’ 
money illusion (inconsistent treatment of inflation): investors were using historical growth rates in earnings to 
forecast future earnings and current interest rates (that incorporate expectations of future inflation), to estimate 
discount rates. When inflation increases, investors would use high discount rates and low cash flows. Damodaran 
(2008) affirms that “it is not so much the level of inflation that determines equity risk premiums but uncertainty 
about that level.” 
26 Polk et al. (2006) argue that if the CAPM holds, then a high equity premium implies low prices for stocks that 
have high betas. Therefore, value stocks should tend to have high betas. This was true from the 1930’s through the 
1950’s, but in recent decades growth stocks had higher betas than value stocks. Polk et al. argue that this change in 
cross-sectional stock pricing reflects a decline in the equity premium.   
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that most of these models have not performed well for the last thirty years, are not stable, and 
are not useful for market-timing purposes.  
But Campbell and Thompson (2008) claim that some variables (stock market valuation ratios, 
patterns in corporate finance, levels of short- and long-term interest rates, level of consumption 
in relation to wealth) are correlated with subsequent market returns and that empirical models, 
restricting their parameters in economically justified ways, yield out-of-sample forecasts that 
beat the historical mean. They explore the mapping from R
2 statistics in predictive regressions 
to profits and welfare gains for market timers. “The basic lesson is that investors should be 
suspicious of predictive regressions with high R
2 statistics, asking the old question ‘If you’re so 
smart, why aren’t you rich?’.” 
Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) point out that economist have snooped data and methods in 
search of models that “seem to predict” the equity premium. Ferson et al. (2003) also conclude 
that “many of the regressions in the literature, based on individual predictor variables, may be 
spurious.” 
4.3. Other Estimates of the Expected Equity Premium 
Siegel (2002, page 124) concluded that “the future equity premium is likely to be in the range of 
2 to 3%, about one-half the level that has prevailed over the past 20 years.”
27 Siegel (2005a, 
page 172) affirms that “over the past 200 years, the equity risk premium has averaged about 
3%”. Siegel (2005b) maintains that “although the future equity risk premium is apt to be lower 
than it has been historically, United States equity returns of 2-3% over bonds will still amply 
reward those who will tolerate the short-term risk of stocks.”  
In the TIAA-CREF Investment Forum of June 2002, Ibbotson forecasted “less than 4% in excess 
of long-term bond yields”, and Campbell “1.5% to 2%.” 
McGrattan and Prescott (2001) did not find corporate equity overvalued in 2000 and forecasted 
a small equity premium in the future. Arnott and Ryan (2001) and Arnott and Bernstein (2002) 
also claim that the expected equity premium is near zero. They base their conclusion on the low 








                                              
27 Siegel also affirms that: “Although it may seem that stocks are riskier than long-term government bonds, this is 
not true. The safest investment in the long run (from the point of view of preserving the investor’s purchasing power) 
has been stocks, not Treasury bonds.”  
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Table 6 
Estimates of the EEP (Expected Equity Premium) according to different authors 
Authors Conclusion  about  EEP  Note 
Surveys     
Pensions and Investments (1998)   3% Institutional  investors 
Graham and Harvey (2000)   4.65%  CFOs 
Welch (2000)   7% arithmetically, 5.2% geometrically  Finance professors 
Welch (2001)   5.5% arithmetically, 4.7% geometrically  Finance professors 
O'Neill, Wilson and Masih (2002)  3.9%  Global clients Goldman 
Graham and Harvey (2007)   2.93%  CFOs 
Other publications      
Booth (1999)  EEP = HEP - 2%    
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001)  4  -6%    
McGrattan and Prescott (2001)  near zero    
Arnott and Ryan (2001)  near zero    
Arnott and Bernstein (2002)  near zero    
Siegel (2002, 2005b)  2 - 3%    
Ibbotson (2002)  < 4%    
Campbell (2002)  1.5 - 2%    
Mayfield (2004)   EEP = HEP - 2.4%= 5.9% + T-Bill    
Bostock (2004)  0.6 – 1.8%   
Welch and Goyal (2008)  EEP = HEP    
Dimson, Marsh and Staunton 
(2007)  3 - 3.5%   
Grabowski (2006)  3.5 – 6%   
Maheu and McCurdy (2008)  4.02% and 5.1%.   
Ibbotson Associates (2006)  EEP = HEP = 7.1%   
Welch (2007)  EEP = 7.9%   
 
 
Bostock (2004) concludes that, according to historical average data, equities should offer a risk 
premium over government bonds between 0.6% and 1.8%. 
Grabowski (2006) concludes that “after considering the evidence, any reasonable long-term 
estimate of the normal EEP as of 2006 should be in the range of 3.5% to 6%.” 
Maheu and McCurdy (2008) claim that the United States Market had “three major structural 
breaks (1929, 1940 and 1969), and possibly a more recent structural break in the late 1990s,” 
and suggest an EEP in 2004 between 4.02% and 5.1%. 
Welch (2007) estimates the EEP for the period 1962-2007 in 7.9%. 
The wide range of the estimates of the EEP may lead to a conclusion similar to that of Brealey 
et al. (2005): “Out of this debate only one firm conclusion emerges: Do not trust anyone who 
claims to know what returns investors expect.” 
5. Required and Implied Equity Premium 
The Required Equity Premium (REP) of an investor is the incremental return that the investor 
requires, over the risk-free rate, for investing in a diversified portfolio of shares. It is a crucial 
parameter in valuation and capital budgeting because the REP is the key to determining the 
company’s required return to equity and the required return to any investment project.  
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However, the HEP is misleading for predicting the REP: if there was a reduction in the REP, this 
fall in the discount rate would lead to re-pricing of stocks, thus adding to the magnitude of 
HEP. The HEP, then, would overstate the REP.  
The IEP is the implicit REP used in the valuation of a stock (or a market index) that matches the 
current market value with an estimate of the future cash flows to equity. The IEP is also called 
the ex ante equity premium. However, the existence of a unique IEP implies either that the 
equity market can be explained with a representative consumer, or that all investors have at 
any moment the same expectations about future cash flows and use the same discount rate to 
value each company. 
Two models are widely used to calculate the IEP: the Gordon (1962) model (constant dividend 
growth model) and the residual income (or abnormal return) model. According to the Gordon 
(1962) model, the current price per share (P0) is the present value of expected dividends 
discounted at the required rate of return (k). If d1 is the dividend per share expected to be 
received at time 1, and g the expected long term growth rate in dividends per share,
28 
 P 0  = d1 / (k - g), which implies:    k  = d1/P0 + g, and   IEP = d1/P0 + g - RF  (1) 
The abnormal return method is another version of the Gordon (1962) model when the “clean 
surplus” relation holds (dt = et – (bvt – bvt-1); d being the dividends per share, e the earnings per 
share and bv the book value per share): 
 P 0  = bv0 + (e1 – k bv0) / (k - g), which implies:    k  = e1/P0 + g (1 - bv0/ P0)
29 (2) 
Jagannathan et al. (2000) use the Gordon model, assume that dividends will growth as fast as 
GNP, and reach an average estimate of 3.04% for 1926-1999. However, they mention that “the 
premium averaged about 7% during 1926-1970 and only about 0.7% after that.” They also 
review Welch (2000) and point out that “apparently, finance professors do not expect the equity 
premium to shrink”. 
Glassman and Hassett (2000) calculated in their book Dow 36,000 that the REP for the United 
States in 1999 was 3%, and argued that stocks should not carry any risk premium at all, and 
that stock prices will rise dramatically further once investors come to realize this fact.
30 
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) calculated the REP using accounting figures and got estimates 
between 4 and 6%. 
Harris and Marston (2001), using the dividend discount model and estimations of the financial 
analysts about long-run growth in earnings, estimated an IEP of 7.14% for the S&P 500 above 
T-Bonds. They also claim that IEP moves inversely with government rates, which is hard to 
believe. 
Claus and Thomas (2001) calculated the equity premium using the Gordon model and the 
residual income model, assuming that g is the consensus of the analysts’ earnings growth 
forecasts for the next five years and that the dividend payout will be 50%. They also assumed 
                                              
28 “Dividends per share”, refers to equity cash flow per share: dividends, repurchases and all expected cash for the 
shareholders. 
29 In a growing perpetuity, d1 = e1 – g bv0. The equivalence of the two models may be seen in Fernández (2005). 
30 Not to be outdone, Kadlec and Acampora (1999) gave their book the title, “Dow 100,000: Fact or Fiction?”.  
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that the residual earnings growth after year 5 will be the current 10-year risk-free rate less 3%. 
With data from 1985 to 1998, they recommended using a REP of about 3% for the United 
States. 
Fama and French (2002), using the dividend discount model, estimated the IEP for the period 
1951-2000 between 2.55% and 4.32%. For the period 1872-1950, they estimated an IEP of 
4.17%. They claimed that “the unconditional EEP of the last 50 years is probably far below the 
realized premium”.
31 Vivian (2005) replicated Fama and French (2002) for the United Kindgom, 
obtained similar results and concluded that the REP declined in the later part of the 20
th 
century. 
Goedhart et al. (2002) used the dividend discount model (considering also share repurchases), 
with GDP growth as a proxy for expected earnings growth and with the average inflation rate 
of the last five years as a proxy for expected inflation. They report an IEP of 5% in 1962-1979 
and 3.6% in 1990-2000 for the United States. They conclude that “the implied equity risk 
premium is around 3.5% to 4% for the United States and the United Kingdom markets.”  
Ritter and Warr (2002) claimed that in 1979-1997, the IEP declined from +12% to -4%, and 
Ritter (2002) claims that it was only 0.7%. 
Easton et al. (2002) used the residual income model with IBES data for expected growth,
32 and 
estimated an average IEP of 5.3% over the years 1981-1998. 
Harris et al. (2003) estimated discount rates for several companies using the dividend discount 
model and assuming that g was equal to the consensus of the analysts’ growth of dividends per 
share forecasts. They found an IEP of 7.3% (if betas calculated with a domestic index) and 9.7% 
(when betas calculated with a world index).  
Faugere and Erlach (2006) claimed that the equity premium tracks the value of a put option on 
the S&P 500. However, their conclusion is not very helpful because they admit that both 3.5% 
and 8.1% are reasonable estimates of the equity premium.  
Donaldson et al. (2007) simulate the distribution from which interest rates, dividend growth 








                                              
31 Fama and French (1992) report that, in the period 1941-1990, an equally weighted index outperformed the value 
weighted (average monthly returns of 1.12% and 0.93%) in the whole period and in most sub sample periods. 
32 Although Chan et al. (2003) report that “IBES forecasts are too optimistic and have low predictive power for long-
term growth.”  
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Table 7 
Implied Equity Premium (IEP) and Required Equity Premium (REP) according to different authors 
Author(s)  Method    IEP = REP (%) 
Jagannathan et al. (2000)   DDM  1926-1999  3.04 
Glassman and Hasset (2000)      3 
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000)  accounting  1968-1995  4 to 6 
Harris and Marston (2001)   DDM  1982-98  7.14 
Claus and Thomas (2001)   RIM  1985-1998  3 
Fama and French (2002)   DDM  1951-2000  2.55 
Fama and French (2002)   DDM  1872-1950  4.17 
Goedhart, Koller, and Wessels (2002)  DDM  1990-2000  3.5 to 4 
Ritter (2002)  DDM  2001  0.7 
Ritter and Warr (2002)   RIM  1979-1997  +12 to -4. 
Easton et al. (2002)  RIM  1981-1998  5.3 
Harris et al. (2003)   DDM  1983-1998  7.3 to 9.7 
Vivian (2005)  DDM & RIM  1951-2002 United Kingdom  4.6 
Ibbotson Associates (2006)  REP=EEP=HEP  1926-2005  7.1 
Donaldson, Kamstra, and Kramer (2007)   DDM 1952-2004 3.5 
Damodaran (2008)  DDM  1928-2008  4.54 
DDM = dividend discount model.  RIM = residual income model 
 
Many authors use an expected growth of dividends per share (g) equal to the consensus of the 
analysts’ forecasts, but Doukas et al. (2006) find that stock returns are positively associated 
with analysts’ divergence of opinion, and consider the divergence of opinion as risk. 
One problem of all these estimates of the IEP is that they are heavily dependent on the model 
used for future cash flows and on the particular assumption made for their expected growth. 
Even if market prices are correct for all investors, there is no unique IEP common for all 
investors: there are many pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy equation (1). A unique IEP requires 
assuming homogeneous expectations for the dividend of next period and for its expected 
growth (g). For example, Figure 4 contains the different values of a share with expected 
dividend in year 1 of $5 for investors with different expectations of growth (g) and different 
equity premium. If the market price is $100, there are many pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy equation 
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Figure 4 
Value of a share for investors with different expectations of growth (g) and different equity premium 








If investors’ expectations were homogenous, all investors would share the same expectation of 
growth (g) and we could calculate a unique IEP. However, expectations are not homogenous
33 
and different investors use different REPs in their valuations. Heterogeneous investors do not 
hold the same portfolio of risky assets; in fact, no investor must hold the market portfolio to 
clear the market. 
We can find out an investor’s REP by asking him, although for many investors the REP is not 
an explicit parameter but, rather, an implicit one that manifests in the price they are prepared 
to pay for shares.
34 However, it is impossible to determine the REP for the market as a whole, 
because it does not exist. Even if we knew the REPs of all the investors, it would be 
meaningless to talk of a REP for the market as a whole. 
A rationale for this may be found in the aggregation theorems of microeconomics, which in 
actual fact are non-aggregation theorems. One model that works well individually for a number 
of people may not work for all of the people together.
35 For the CAPM, this means that although 
the CAPM may be a valid model for each investor, it is not valid for the market as a whole, 
because investors do not have the same return and risk expectations for all shares. Prices are a 
statement of expected cash flows discounted at a rate that includes the risk premium. Different 
investors have different cash flow expectations and different future risk expectations. One could 
only talk of an equity premium if all investors had the same cash flow expectations. But without 
homogeneous expectations, there is no “expected growth rate for the market.” 
Similarly, for having an EEP common for all investors we need to assume homogeneous 
expectations (or a representative investor) and, with our knowledge of financial markets, this 
                                              
33 Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2006) document analysts’ divergence of opinion. 
34 An example: An investor of Figure 3 is prepared to pay $80 for a perpetual annual cash flow of $5 in year 1 and 
growing at an annual rate of 2%, which he expects to obtain from a diversified equity portfolio. This means that his 
required market return is 8.25% ([5/80] + 0.02), and the REP is 4.25%. 
35 As Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page 120) say, “it is not true that whenever aggregate demand can be generated by a 
representative consumer, this representative consumer’s preferences have normative contents. It may even be the case 
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assumption is not reasonable. Nor can a theory with a representative investor explain why the 
annual trading volume of most exchanges is more than twice their market capitalization. David 
(2008) claims that “the representative agent paradigm with identical agents fails to take into 
account the speculative behaviour of different agents in the economy,” and shows that in an 
exchange economy with only two types of investors with heterogeneous beliefs about growth, 
they speculate with each other on the relative accuracy of their models’ predictions. 
For calculating the cost of equity (required return to equity cash flows) of a company, a 
valuator has to answer the following question: which differential rate over current T-Bond 
yields do I think compensates the risk of holding the shares? If there is only one owner of the 
shares, we can ask him the question directly. But if it is a traded company, the valuator has to 
make a prudential judgment. As Grabowski (2006), points out, “the entire appraisal process is 
based on applying reasoned judgment to the evidence derived from economic, financial and 
other information and arriving at a well reasoned opinion of value.”  
We need the cost of equity to discount the expected equity cash flows of the company. Note 
that there is a kind of schizophrenic approach to valuation: while all authors admit that 
different valuators and investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows, most 
authors look for a unique discount rate. It seems as if the expectations of equity cash flows are 
formed in a democratic regime, while the discount rate is determined in a dictatorship. In any 
market, different investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows and different 
evaluations of its risk (that translate into different discount rates). In the case of a traded 
company, there are investors who think that the company is undervalued (and buy or hold 
shares), investors who think that the company is overvalued (and sell or short shares), and 
investors who think that the company is fairly valued. The investors that did the last trade (and 
the rest of the investors that held or did not have shares) did not have a common REP (nor 
common expectations of the equity cash flows). 
6. The Equity Premium in the Textbooks 
The recommendations of the textbooks are important because many investors, portfolio 
managers… received their first exposure to the equity premium in the classroom and many 
practitioners often offer academic work (textbooks and papers) as backing for the numbers that 
they use. Textbooks matter more than papers because they shape the minds and reasoning of 
young economists and because they are most influential among corporate practitioners (they 
may read Brealey and Myers, but not finance journals). 
Fernández (2008a) reviews 100 textbooks on finance and valuation published between 1979 
and 2008 and finds that the mean recommendation for the REP is 6.6%. There is no generally 
accepted equity premium point estimate (the range goes from 3% to 10%) and nor is there a 
common method to estimate it, although the overwhelming majority of the books (88) claim 
that the REP =  EEP, use the HEP as the best estimation of the EEP (59) and explicitly 
recommend using the CAPM for calculating the required return to equity (89). 
Table 8 contains the equity premium recommended and used in different editions of the several 
textbooks with greatest unit sales according to two publishers. 
Brealey and Myers considered until 1996 that REP = EEP = HEP: 8.3% in 1984 and 8.4% in 
1988, 1991 and 1996.
 But in 2000 and 2003, they stated that “Brealey and Myers have no  
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official position on the exact market risk premium, but we believe a range of 6 to 8.5% is 
reasonable for the United States.” In 2005, they increased that range to 5 to 8%. 
Copeland et al. (1990 and 1995), authors of the McKinsey book on valuation, advised using a 
REP = HEP, which were 6% and 5.5% respectively. However, in 2000 they recommended 4.5-
5% and in 2005 they used a REP of 4.8% that was the HEP reduced by a survivorship bias.
36 
Ross et al. recommended in all editions that REP = EEP = HEP: 8.5% (1988-96), 9.2% (1999), 
9.5% (2002) and 8.4% (2005).  
Bodie et al. (1993) used a REP = EEP = 6.5%. In 1996, they used a REP = EEP = HEP – 1% = 7.75%. 
In 2002, they used a REP = 6.5%, but in 2003 and 2004, they used different REPs: 8% and 5%.  
Table 8 
Equity premiums recommended and used in some textbooks 




recommended  REP used 
Brealey and Myers          
2nd edition. 1984  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1981  8.3%  8.3% 
3rd edition. 1988  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1985  8.4%  8.4% 
4th edition. 1991  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1988  8.4%  8.4% 
5th edition. 1996  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1995  8.2 - 8.5%  8.0% 
6th and 7th edition. 2000 and 2003  No official position    6.0 - 8.5%  8.0%  
8th edition. 2005 (with Allen)  No official position    5.0 - 8.5%  6-8.5% 
Copeland, Koller, and Murrin (McKinsey)        
1st edition. 1990  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-1988  5 - 6%  6.0% 
2nd ed. 1995  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-1992  5 - 6%  5.5% 
3rd ed. 2000  REP=EEP= arith HEP – 1.5-2%  1926-1998  4.5 - 5%  5.0% 
4th ed. 2005. Goedhart, Koller, & Wessels  REP=EEP= arith HEP – 1-2%  1903-2002  3.5 - 4.5%  4.8% 
Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe           
2nd edition. 1988  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1988  8.5%  8.5% 
3rd edition. 1993  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1993  8.5%  8.5% 
4th edition. 1996  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1994  8.5%  8.5% 
5th edition. 1999  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1997  9.2%  9.2% 
6th edition. 2002  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-1999  9.5%  9.5% 
7th edition. 2005  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-2002  8.4%  8.0% 
Bodie, Kane, and Marcus          
2nd edition. 1993  REP=EEP    6.5%   6.5% 
3rd edition. 1996  REP=EEP=arith HEP vs. T-Bills - 1%    7.75%  7.75%  
5th edition. 2002      6.5%   6.5% 
2003  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-2001    5%; 8%  
Damodaran 1994 Valuation. 1
st ed.  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-1990  5.5%  5.5% 
1996, 1997, 2001b,  2001c  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds    5.5%  5.5% 
2001a average  IEP  1970-2000  4.0%  4.0% 
2002  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1928-2000  5.51%  5.51% 
2006 Valuation. 2
nd ed.  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1928-2004  4.84%  4.0% 
Bodie and Merton (2000)        8% 
Stowe et al. (2002)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-2000  5.7%  5.7% 
Penman (2001, 2003)  “No one  knows what the REP is”      6.0% 
Bruner (2004)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-2000  6%  6.0% 
Palepu, Healy, and Bernard (2004)   REP=EEP= arith HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-2002  7%  7.0% 
Arzac (2007)  REP=IEP   5.08%  5.08% 
                                              
36 In 1990 and 1995 they calculated the HEP using geometric averages (“because arithmetic averages are biased by 
the measurement period”), but in 2000 and 2005 they used arithmetic averages.  
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Damodaran recommended in 1994, 1996, 1997, 2001b, 2001c and 2002 REP = EEP = HEP = 
5.5%.
37 In 2001a and 2006, he used a REP = IEP = 4%.  
Bodie and Merton (2000) used 8% for United States, while Stowe et al. (2002, Chartered 
Financial Analysts Program) used a REP = HEP = 5.7%.
38 
According to Penman (2001), “the market risk premium is a big guess… No one knows what the 
market risk premium is.” In 2003, he admitted that “estimates [of the equity premium] range, in 
texts and academic research, from 3.0% to 9.2%,” and he used 6%. 
Bruner (2004) used a REP = HEP = 6%, Palepu et al. (2004) 7%, and Arzac (2007) used a REP of 
4.36%; the IEP calculated using a Gordon equation. 
Siegel (2002) concluded that “the EEP is likely to be in the range of 2 to 3%, about one-half the 
level that has prevailed over the past 20 years”.
39 Siegel (2007) affirms that “the abnormally 
high HEP since 1926 is certainly not sustainable.” 
According to Shapiro (2005, page 148) “an expected equity risk premium of 4 to 6% appears 
reasonable. In contrast, the historical equity risk premium of 7% appears to be too high for 
current conditions.” However, he uses different REPs in his examples: 5%, 7.5% and 8%. 
Figure 5 collects the evolution of the Required Equity Premium (REP) used or recommended by the 
textbooks and by the academic papers mentioned in previous sections. The average of the 
recommendations is 6.3% in the textbooks and 4.2% in the papers. Looking at Figure 5 and at 
Table 8, it is quite obvious that there is not much consensus among finance authors regarding the 
equity premium: perhaps the conventional wisdom is not wisdom, but confusion. Why this is so? 
Figure 5 
Evolution of the Required and Expected Equity Premium used or recommended in the most 








                                              
37 Damodaran (2001c, page 192): “we must confess that this is more for the sake of continuity with the previous 
version of the book and for purposes of saving a significant amount of reworking practice problems and solutions.” 
38 They also mention the “bond yield plus risk premium method.” Under this approach, the cost of equity is equal to 
the “yield to maturity on the company´s long-term debt plus a typical risk premium of 3-4%, based on experience.” 
39 Siegel also affirms that: “Although it may seem that stocks are riskier than long-term government bonds, this is 
not true. The safest investment in the long run (from the point of view of preserving the investor’s purchasing power) 
has been stocks, not Treasury bonds.” 
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The REPs used to calculate the cost of equity in the teaching notes published by Harvard 
Business School have decreased over time. Until 1989 most teaching notes used REPs between 
8 and 9%; in 1989, the REPs used were in the 6-9% range, and in 2000 6%. The REPs used in 
the teaching notes published by the Darden Business School over that period have been in the 
5.4-6% range. 
Ritter (2002) mentions the use of the HEP in textbooks as an estimate of the EEP as one of the 
"The Biggest Mistakes We Teach."  
7. Conclusion 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) argued that, according to sensible asset pricing models, stocks 
should provide at most a 0.35% premium over bills. However, professors use in, class and in 
their textbooks, higher equity premia (average around 6%, range from 3 to 10%), investors use 
higher equity premia for valuing companies, and companies use higher equity premia (average 
around 6%) for evaluating their investment projects. The overall result is that equity prices are, 
on average, undervalued (and have been undervalued in the last decades) and, consequently, 
the measured ex-post equity premium (HEP) is also high. 
If the additional returns beyond the risk-free rate demanded by equity investors (ex-ante risk 
premia) and used in financial asset pricing models have been high, it is not a surprise that the 
ex-post risk premia (calculated with historical data) have been also high. If most investors use 
historical data to estimate the required and the expected equity premium, the undervaluation 
and the high ex-post risk premium are self fulfilling prophecies. 
The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market premium 
and risk premium), is one of the most important, discussed but elusive parameters in finance. 
The term equity premium is used to designate four different concepts (although they are often 
mixed): Historical Equity Premium (HEP), Expected Equity Premium (EEP); Required Equity 
Premium (REP) and Implied Equity Premium (IEP).  
It has been argued that, from an economic standpoint, we need to establish the primacy of the 
EEP, since it is what guides investors' decisions. However, the REP is more important for many 
important decisions; among others, valuations of projects and companies, acquisitions, and 
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